I recently went to a lecture at the Australian Defence College about deterrence and Australia's strategic priorities. It all made sense theoretically, but I wondered whether our approach to defence was actually a sensible or practical one. Who are we actually trying to deter, and in what time-frame - and do our strategic priorities make sense?
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Geography is Australia's best defence asset, making an invasion of Australia extremely difficult, so we probably don't need a force structured to fight off an invader. Past history has shown that we are much more likely to be involved in a distant conflict as a result of a political decision to help our close allies - with the wishful thinking that if we ever need military assistance, America will come over the horizon to our rescue.
These political decisions have seen us end up fighting in Malaya, Korea, Vietnam, Borneo, Iraq, Afghanistan and potentially Ukraine and Taiwan. None of these had - or have - any relevance to a direct threat to Australia. Assuming that this will continue to be the case, it makes more sense for our forces to be focused not only on defending Australia but also on being able to undertake expeditionary activity some distance away.
Defence reviews invariably end up tweaking a conventional force structure to meet the vested interests of the individual services. That usually means more big-ticket items. The army will want new tanks, the navy will want new large surface vessels, and the air force will want state-of-the-art manned aircraft. Part of this is keeping up with the Joneses - having what our close allies have. Fortunately, we don't have much of a lobby for an aircraft carrier. Often an adequate and cheaper option for Australia would be buying secondhand but proven platforms from the US (including submarines).
What recent conflicts have taught us in spades is that it's unwise to invest in expensive platforms that can be taken out by cheap counter-systems. Expensive American tanks proved vulnerable in Iraq to explosively formed projectiles produced by Iran for under a hundred dollars, while Russian tanks in Ukraine have proved vulnerable to relatively inexpensive Western antitank missiles. (It's noteworthy that in 2020 the US Marine Corps decided to do away with its tanks and has already done so.)
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Incidentally, the US Marine Corps and Royal Marines provide the US and UK respectively with a very useful and flexible amphibious capability. Should we be thinking of having a similar force, deployable within our region from one or two fast hydrofoils, like the one we used to resupply our troops in Timor? These relatively inexpensive vessels originally produced in Australian (and since adopted by the US Marine Corps and built in the US) would also be very useful for civilian evacuations and disaster relief.
Large naval surface vessels are unlikely to last for long against an enemy that has surface-to-surface missiles. The Ukrainian sinking of the flagship of the Russian Navy's Black Sea Fleet, the cruiser Moskva, using two Neptune anti-ship missiles being a recent example.
The current conflict in Ukraine has also shown that in modern warfare unmanned aircraft and a range of drones configured to surveil and attack are a very useful asset. Another lesson is the need for mobility. Static attack systems like emplaced artillery are vulnerable to rapid counterattack, hence the need for self-propelled guns. (Australia has already ordered 30.)
The best option for a modern Australian defence force would seem to be: an army that is highly mobile - equipped with small agile lightly-armoured air-portable combat vehicles (with V-shaped hulls for IED protection), antitank and surface-to-air missiles, and surveillance drones; a navy that is mainly operating small fast missile attack vessels, nuclear-powered submarines and unmanned underwater vehicles, and; an air force that is not overly reliant on vulnerable manned combat aircraft.
Air forces in the future may need to rely more on unmanned platforms and drone swarms to overcome adversaries. (The US Air Force already flies more unmanned missions than manned ones.)
A useful addition to the current force structure would be a cyberwarfare element that can engage in cyber-attack and defence, and disinformation operations at the tactical level. Conflicts are fought for combatant's minds as well as kinetically.
The Albanese government has commissioned a Defence Strategic Review to report in early 2023 on investment priorities. It's to be hoped that it's taking on board some of the lessons of modern conflict. What we don't need is an updated conventional force similar to what we already have, primarily designed to fight off or deter a notional Chinese invader.
- Clive Williams is a visiting fellow at the ANU's Strategic and Defence Studies Centre